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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE TOPIC OF CURRENT INTEREST

(II. THE USSR AND EASTERN EUROPE)

II.1.

*How much warning of an attack can the United States expect? To what extent are Soviet active and passive measures likely to degrade warning?*

The establishment on 1 October 1978 of an NIO for Warning has provided a stronger mechanism for dealing with this topic. Implementation of the production strategy proposed earlier in the year for this NIT was deferred, however, while new interagency warning procedures were being worked out and put into effect

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
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(II. THE USSR AND EASTERN EUROPE)

II.2.

*How do key Soviet leaders perceive the US? How do they assess US foreign policy, its objectives and tactics, and US ability to pursue its objectives? What key factors underlie their assessments? In which areas does the US have leverage? What developments on which issues could substantially alter the current US-USSR relationship?*

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
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II.3.

*What are the guiding purposes, objectives, and intentions behind current Soviet foreign and military policy? What is the Soviet leadership's view of acceptable risk?*

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II.4.

*How do the Soviets view the strategic balance? To what extent do their objectives include "damage limiting" and "winning" in a strategic nuclear exchange? What in their view would constitute "winning," and how do they assess their current and future prospects for "winning" and for "damage limiting"? What are Soviet strategies, capabilities, and vulnerabilities for nuclear warfare, especially with regard to: preemption, launch on warning, and retaliation; targeting and weapon employment doctrine; and future command, control, and communications capabilities? What choices will the Soviets make in strategic deployment and modernization programs, e.g., cruise missiles, weapon accuracies, and civil defense?*

All of the questions and subtopics listed under this NIT were addressed in national estimates, interagency memorandums, DCI Committee reports and single-agency publications during 1978.

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II.5.

*What are the USSR's objectives on arms control issues--e.g., SALT, MBFR, CTB, nonproliferation, Indian Ocean? What kind of SALT III will the Soviets accept? What areas are the most difficult/easiest for them? Do they want a meaningful MBFR agreement: What kind could they accept that would be acceptable to us and to our allies?*

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
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II.6.

*What are the prospects for, and implications of,  
the succession in the USSR?*



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II.7.

*What will be the economic pressures on, and the economic vulnerabilities of, the USSR over the next two to three years--e.g., grain, energy, and rate of growth? What are the implications for Soviet relations with the US, for East-West trade, for military involvement in Third World areas, and for domestic cohesion and strategic posture?*

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
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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE TOPIC OF CURRENT INTEREST

(II. THE USSR AND EASTERN EUROPE)

II.8.

*What are Soviet military intentions and capabilities for space?*



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
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II.9.

*What are Soviet strategies, capabilities, and vulnerabilities for conventional warfare? For war in Europe? What are the military trends in the Warsaw Pact, including its concepts, doctrines, intentions, and capabilities?*



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II.10.

*What are the capabilities and effectiveness  
of Soviet and East European intelligence?*



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II.11.

*What economic pressures are building up in Eastern Europe, and how severe will they become--particularly hard currency debt problems and sources of raw material and energy? How much latitude will the East European states have to seek economic cooperation with the West? How will economic difficulties affect domestic stability of the East European states, particularly Poland? What will be the implications for the cohesion and reliability of the Warsaw Pact?*

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II.12.

*What are the prospects in Yugoslavia after Tito dies? How will the Soviets react?*

Evidence of changing prospects for the succession to Tito was the subject of considerable current intelligence production and short memorandums in the last few months of 1978. At the same time, one major research paper relevant to this topic was published, discussing what is known of Soviet presence and influence in Yugoslavia.



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## II The USSR and Eastern Europe

1. How much warning of an attack can the United States expect? To what extent are Soviet active and passive measures likely to degrade warning?
2. How do key Soviet leaders perceive the US? How do they assess US foreign policy, its objectives and tactics, and US ability to pursue its objectives? What key factors underlie their assessments? In which areas does the US have leverage? What developments on which issues could substantially alter the current US-USSR relationship?
3. What are the guiding purposes, objectives, and intentions behind current Soviet foreign and military policy? What is the Soviet leadership's view of acceptable risk?
4. How do the Soviets view the strategic balance? To what extent do their objectives include "damage limiting" and "winning" in a strategic nuclear exchange? What in their view would constitute "winning," and how do they assess their current and future prospects for "winning" and for "damage limiting"? What are Soviet strategies, capabilities, and vulnerabilities for nuclear warfare, especially with regard to: preemption, launch on warning, and retaliation; targeting and weapon employment doctrine; and future command, control, and communications capabilities? What choices will the Soviets make in strategic deployment and modernization programs, e.g., cruise missiles, weapon accuracies, and civil defense?
5. What are the USSR's objectives on arms control issues—e.g., SALT, MBFR, CTB, nonproliferation, Indian Ocean? What kind of SALT III will the Soviets accept? What areas are the most difficult/easiest for them? Do they want a meaningful MBFR agreement? What kind could they accept that would be acceptable to us and to our allies?
6. What are the prospects for, and implications of, the succession in the USSR?
7. What will be the economic pressures on, and the economic vulnerabilities of, the USSR over the next two to three years—e.g., grain, energy, and rate of growth? What are the implications for Soviet relations with the US, for East-West trade, for military involvement in Third World areas, and for domestic cohesion and strategic posture?
8. What are Soviet military intentions and capabilities for space?
9. What are Soviet strategies, capabilities, and vulnerabilities for conventional warfare? For war in Europe? What are the military trends in the Warsaw Pact, including its concepts, doctrines, intentions, and capabilities?

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10. What are the capabilities and effectiveness of Soviet and East European intelligence?
11. What economic pressures are building up in Eastern Europe, and how severe will they become—particularly hard currency debt problems and sources of raw material and energy? How much latitude will the East European states have to seek economic cooperation with the West? How will economic difficulties affect domestic stability of the East European states, particularly Poland? What will be the implications for the cohesion and reliability of the Warsaw Pact?
12. What are the prospects in Yugoslavia after Tito dies? How will the Soviets react?